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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the ways in which Edmund Husserl develops the question of God. Six 
ways to reach God are shown as present in Husserl’s writings, some of them seem to be very 
close to the traditional philosophical ways to go as far as God (the objective and the subjective 
ways) others are very original, in particular the way that starts from the analysis of the hyletic 
sphere of the human being, a sphere which is present in all the reality too. At last it is possible 
to notice Husserl’s interest in the mystical approach to God.
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I am very glad to deal once again with the problem of God in Edmund Husserl, 
because it is a very important topic in itself and in Husserl’s phenomenology. 
First of all I think that it is necessary to say something about his own phe‑
nomenological analyses gained through his method in order to understand his 
approach to God.
To perform this task I refer to the results of my research contained in my 
book The divine in Husserl and other explorations (Ales Bello, 2009) which 
consists of three parts. The first one is the philosophical ‑phenomenological 
approach to God. The second is the Husserlian, personal, religious approach. 
The third concerns, staring from Husserl, but going beyond him, the pos‑
sibility of building a new discipline “phenomenology of religion”, which, in 
my opinion, is halfway between history of religions and philosophy of re‑
ligion. But on this occasion I want just to remain within the field of the 
philosophical ‑phenomenological approach to God.
My book begins with a description of phenomenology as a philosophy 
which I would call sui generis, that is, a new kind of philosophy. In fact, I think 
that it is necessary to say something about his own phenomenological analyses 
in order to understand his approach to God.
The novelty of Husserlian phenomenology resides in bracketing all one’s 
prejudices through the epoche, but what is more important, through the epoche 
the thesis of the natural attitude is put aside, not in the sense that there is a ne‑
gation of the world, on the contrary, to understand better what the meaning 
of the world is, and not only of the world, but the meaning of the I inside the 
world and also the meaning of God. This is done, according to Husserl, in an 
attempt to show what exists originary, and I should like to quote from Husserl:
If I do that as I can with complete freedom, then I am not negating the world as 
though I were a sophist. I do not doubt its factual being as though I were a skeptic. 
Rather I am exercising the phenomenological epoche, which also completely shuts me 
off from any judgments about the spatial, temporal, factual being (Husserl, 1982: 61).
The problem concerns factual being, in the sense that we cannot deny our 
beings. What we want to understand is its meaning, the meaning of the world, 
and so the meaning of what exists. And the epoche permits us to conquer through 
the pathway of the two reductions, the eidetic one and the transcendental one, 
“a new region of being, never before delimited in its own peculiarity” (Husserl, 
1982: 63). This new territory can be understood through an image. I suggest 
to show Husserl’s intention through a picture. This new territory can be under‑
stood through the image of a pane of glass, that is inside us and on which we 
fix that which we live inside in a continuous flow of inscriptions. I use the term 
glass pane to indicate that such a sphere exists, but is not easily individuated. 
In fact, because of its transparency, it always eludes our searching, even if it is 
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always present. On the surface of the glass pane the finished products are given. 
That is, one finds the lived experiences already configured and they are the way 
in which we live our experience. But they are the fruit of a genetic process that 
must be studied through an egological excavation.
We are aware of these lived experiences, when they are already configured 
and this justifies the term consciousness, which does not refer to a second de‑
gree consciousness, that is reflection, but rather just being conscious of oneself. 
To employ a beautiful expression from Edith Stein, who was one of Husserl’s 
closest students, self ‑consciousness presents itself as a light that accompanies 
the flow of lived experiences and which illumines it in order to make it present.
Lived experiences (Erlebnisse) are human acts but on the glass pane they ap‑
pear in their essential structure as lived experiences of the ego on diverse levels 
and various modalities, which can be examined in a structural and essential mode, 
as present in every concrete I. So we have two levels, the structure of the I which 
lives in ourselves and our concrete I; the glass pane however is a transcendental 
structure because it is the place that allows for the revelation of meaning from 
the view point of the understanding. It does not create anything. It registers and 
this recording has a universal value. It happens in all human beings. And that 
is very important because through the analysis of our lived experiences we can 
understand the world which surrounds us, we can understand ourselves, and we 
can understand God.
Husserl’s position regarding God differs from other positions because it is by 
starting from the sphere of lived experiences that we can reach God. Further, in 
delineating a modality for the transcendence of God, one begins to understand the 
function carried out by these lived experiences. In fact, on such a foundation one 
sees that within lived experiences certain aspects are established that correspond 
to the factual concatenations of mental processes with distinct and regular orders 
which present to us an ordered world. The world is ordered; it is not determined 
by chance. We can say that the physical sciences also give us evidence of the estab‑
lished order of the world. In other words, it is possible to delineate exact natural 
laws because the world has a rational structure. Furthermore, this rationality is seen 
to have a scope. A concept emerges here that will be fundamental for the interpre‑
tation of many aspects of reality, including divine reality, namely, teleology.
THE OBJECTIVE WAY TO GOD
Teleology is a Greek word, which we can translate as finality. According to 
Husserl, some examples of teleology can be found in the natural world. We 
can understand this world through our lived experiences, as we have seen. One 
can find, in the natural world, the factual evolution of a series of organisms, in‑
cluding the human being. One also finds examples in the human world, as with 
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the growth of a culture with its spiritual treasures. So we have the possibility to 
understand that what we grasp regarding the world has a teleology — it is not 
without a scope, without an aim. In order to understand just what the ultimate 
sense of this development is, Husserl introduces the problem of God.
Rationality in the sense of the scope, the meaning of the world’s rational 
structure brings us before an existence that is extra ‑worldly, that is divine, a di‑
vine being. I quote from Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phe-
nomenological philosophy where we find this argument in both § 58 and § 51. 
Husserl writes: “This being would obviously transcend not merely the world 
but absolute consciousness” (Husserl, 1982: 134). And this is very important. 
Our consciousness is absolute with respect to us, in the sense that we cannot 
escape our consciousness. Our consciousness is the starting point for us, for our 
knowledge of ourselves and of things. And Husserl goes on: “It would therefore 
be an absolute, in a sense totally different from that in which consciousness is 
absolute” (Husserl, 1982: 134). God is absolute but is absolute in another sense 
regarding the absolute of our consciousness. So there is a double use of the term 
“absolute”, one regarding ourselves and the other regarding God. For this reason 
we have two levels of absoluteness. Just as we have two levels of transcendence: 
God would be something transcendent in a sense totally different from that in 
which the world is something transcendent regarding us.
So in order to justify reality and to justify the teleology, i.e., finality in 
reality, we have to go, in a rational manner, through our minds and go as far 
as an absolute which is totally different from our consciousness, something 
that is transcendent but in a sense totally different from the transcendence of 
the world. We have two meanings, also in this case of transcendence. There is 
the transcendence of the world and the transcendence of the transcendence of 
the world, which is God. This way of reasoning is very close, I have found, to 
what Thomas Aquinas said regarding the way in which our mind can go as far 
as God and this is the fifth proof, the so ‑called teleology proof. St. Thomas 
presented this in his Summa theologica.
THE SUBJECTIVE WAY TO GOD
The second way to reach God is connected to medieval philosophy too — this 
is my idea, since Husserl never quoted Thomas in the sense of teleology that 
leads to theology (objective way) or Anselm in the sense of the subjective way. 
But if we compare what Husserl says, starting from our consciousness of God, 
we find really something very interesting also in connection with Anselm.
Anselm, in his book Proslogion, says that he wants us to concentrate upon 
God. And Husserl exhorts us to concentrate on our conscious lived experience. 
Anselm writes:
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Enter into the chamber of your mind and shut out everything but God and whatever 
helps us to seek him and to seek him behind closed doors (Anselm of Aosta, 2005: 97).
And Husserl writes in Ideas I:
[…] there must be therefore within the absolute stream of consciousness and in its 
infinities, modes in which transcendences are made known other than the constituting 
of physical realities as unities of harmonious appearances (Husserl, 1982: 117).
These modes lead us not just as far as the world, but also as far as God, 
because there is something transcendent, within ourselves — and this “Some‑
thing” is lived by ourselves. So we have another way through which we discover 
that we can speak about God and about teleology that leads to theology be‑
cause we already know the meaning of Something that is greater than us, and 
that is the justification of all reality. The proof that among the transcendences 
there is the transcendence of God is contained in what Husserl adds:
[…] and ultimately there would also have to be intuitional manifestations to which a the‑
oretical thinking might conform, so that, by following them rationally, it might make 
intelligible the unitary rule of the supposed theological principle (Husserl, 1982: 117).
Though Husserl never spoke about the two medieval philosophers we find 
in his analyses an extraordinary connection with their argumentations. And 
according to me, the second way is very important, because it pinpoints the 
presence of Something that transcends us and it registers itself on the sphere 
of our intimate experience. In this way we can understand what Husserl says 
about the announcement of an intuitive order that leads to God and that is at 
the same time felt as almighty Presence in us and realized by our minds. In 
fact Husserl says that, starting from this profound experience, we can, through 
reflection, enter into the field of philosophy. So it is not just a religious experi‑
ence, though it could also be a religious experience, and we can see later that 
this is the case for Husserl, but for the moment we will use this experience just 
to understand the ultimate meaning of all things.
THE INTERSUBJECTIVE WAY TO GOD
The third way is the intersubjective way which Husserl explicitly links to one 
of the most interesting philosophers of the Modern Age, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. Both Husserl and Leibniz are interested in the human being as a mon‑
ad. Monad means something which is individual but not in the sense that it 
is closed. According to Husserl, we are not closed, we are open toward other 
people too. What is important in the human monad is the I. The I is the real 
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part of the human monad. If a coordination of monads is possible — and we 
have already seen there is an ordered world, and so a coordination is possible, 
and the correlation is already something in which monads find themselves — 
such a correlation can only be established by an I. But it requires another I, not 
only our I, others I like us, but an I which not only organizes and coordinates 
but also “creates”. We find some texts on this problem in Phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity, in Book II. I quote:
Is there an I that experiences nature and the world, constituted in common in all finite 
Is, with the eyes of these Is, which has in itself all their thoughts, that acts within all 
as an I, which “creates” nature and the world in the sense of “the idea of the good”? 
(Husserl, 1973a: 302)
If this great I creates, his creation is performed according to the criteria of 
the good, which allows us to have an optimistic vision of this world, or at least 
something basic to which we can aspire. Here we find the word “creation” and 
this word is important because we not only can but we must say that God is 
Something which, or better Who (for God is a person according to Husserl) 
transcends the world, He also creates the world. We can make note that Hus‑
serl always raises the question of God only at the end of a certain philosophical 
trajectory. That is, his aim is not to prove the existence of God, that is not 
necessary according to him, or, better, it is not his problem. The problem is 
another one. It is necessary to think about God if we want to understand the 
meaning of things. As such, we have to go through a coherent reflection as 
far as we are dealing with the principle of the whole. When Husserl raised the 
problem of God, sometimes he spoke about Absolute but he almost always use 
directly the word: God.
THE WAY THROUGH THE HYLETIC DIMENSION TO GOD
The fourth way is quite original in that it is the way through hyletics. First 
I should clarify what hyletics is for Husserl. The level of the transcendental 
sphere, that is our lived experiences of which we are conscious, is where facts 
become clarified. We have already seen that it is not enough to say that there 
are some facts — we want to understand their meanings. The fact of human 
existence is individuated through a reductive investigation and in it we find in an 
originary structure, a primal moment, which is the hyletic level. I wrote about 
the importance of it in my book The sense of things: Towards a phenomenological 
realism (Ales Bello, 2015a), here I give just a short account of this level.
Husserl says “originary hyle presents itself ”. What is the meaning of the 
word hyle? Hyle is a Greek word that means “matter”. But in this case it is not 
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matter as in something heavy, rather, it is just the ground starting from which 
we can understand how we can know all the reality. I will provide some exam‑
ples. Originary hyle presents itself linked up with the originary movements of 
our body to which do correspond originary sentiments and originary instincts.
It is not enough to speak about reason when we want to describe the hu‑
man being, because he/she is a very complex being. Reason is one very im‑
portant aspect of the human being, but the human being has a body, that is, 
he/she is embodied, has sensations and moves, further the human being has 
sentiments, instincts that is psyche. The two aspects, body and psyche, con‑
stituted the living body. All of this is originary “material” — and this is the 
meaning of hyle in Husserlian sense — that we can find at the bottom of what 
we call the world. In fact this sphere is not just a human sphere as we can find 
instincts, feelings and so on even in the animal world. But this “matter”, this 
whole hyletic sphere, has an essential grammar and essential grammar means 
that it has a meaning. Further, it has its essential alphabet in the lowest levels 
of the human being.
That which we are pointing to here is not only a passive, unconscious, and 
instinctual unifying structure, it is indeed so, but it also possesses a meaning 
and, according to Husserl, its own finality. Teleology is not just the teleology 
of our explicit aims, of our ethical attitude and of our culture. Rather, teleol‑
ogy manifests itself at that originary level. Teleology, then, has its origin in the 
facts of the hyle which are originary in the widest sense. Without these, no to‑
tally transcendental subjectivity would be possible. Here I refer to a manuscript 
Teleologie. Die Implikation des Eidos transzendentale Intersubjectivität im Eidos 
transzendentales Ich (November 1921), which we can find in the Phenomenology 
of intersubjectivity, Book III, in which Husserl writes:
Teleology manifests itself at the transcendental level, but it has its origin in the facts of 
the hyle that are “originary” (in the widest sense); without these no world and no total 
transcendental subjectivity would be possible (Husserl, 1973b: 385).
At this point an interesting question arises:
Things being what they are, can one say that this teleology, with its originary factic‑
ity, has its foundation in God? We came to the ultimate “questions of facts” — to the 
questions of originary fact, to the ultimate necessities, the originary necessity (Hus‑
serl, 1973b: 385).
With this, Husserl says that it is possible to go as far as God, starting from 
the hyletic sphere or better it is necessary to go to God to explain the teleology 
present in the hyletic sphere in so far as this hyletic sphere seems to be chaotic, 
but, on the contrary, it is ordered.
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We remind ourselves of Aristotle and of the connection or correlation be‑
tween the formal and the final causes and this is why teleology is defined as 
the “form of all forms” by Husserl. In Husserl I find something more than in 
Thomas Aquinas, in the sense that he speaks about the teleology starting from 
this passive, instinctual level and in this sense we can say that the teleology is 
the form of all forms, in fact it operates at all grades of reality. In Husserl one 
has to be aware of the hyletic sphere and has to start from the hyletic level, if 
one wants to understand in a deeper way the meaning of God.
THE ETHICAL WAY TO GOD
There is another possibility for understanding God, which is connected to eth‑
ics. We find this in particular in Husserl’s Erste Philosophie. In the Text Versuch 
einer Scheidung der Stadien auf dem Weg zu einer Wissenschaft von der transze-
ndentalen Subjektivität he writes that if one considers value proposition, which 
divide into desiring and volitional propositions, concepts of truth are deline‑
ated. Insofar as they are practical truths, they can be placed next to theoretical 
truths (Husserl, 1956: 251–258).
Examining the human associations, Husserl had already emphasized the 
value of the community, which is based on the spiritual life and requires an 
ethical life which can be able to establish spiritual links among people (Hus‑
serl, 1989). Going on this path and analyzing the complexity of the human life, 
he maintained that the ethical life does not exclude sentiment, which we see 
in the way he distanced himself from Kant. Ethics must embrace sentiments. 
Husserl goes beyond Kant in the sense that there can be joy that is born from 
the value of beauty, which is accessed concretely by being in front of qualita‑
tive contents like ideas, in particular, the idea of a human being, individually 
considered. In this case, the I becomes a pure sort of value.
Here there is a sort of interior call towards an absolute beauty that arises on 
the basis of love. Love in this sense is a spiritual sentiment and it means that 
I love the world, I love other people, which in turn means that I want that they 
receive what is best for them. This call is delineated within the depths of each 
person and must be responded to, by adopting a rational position. Rational in 
this sense means that I understand that I have to do what is good.
The idea of a community of love is concomitant with the ethical ideal of 
a rational humanity, that is a humanity that is aware of its own ethical task. 
And in this sense the world is not left to itself, to its destiny. One has a glimpse 
into it, and sees it as a providential project. Husserl writes:
There is no blind fate; God “regulates” the world. The world “aspires to” absolute 
paths, to values; God prepares in the heart of human beings the way to such paths. 
On the divine in Husserl 279
Humans could realize a divine world in the freedom that one finds in the world (Hus‑
serl, 1956: 16).
Here we have an openness towards religion. Human freedom needs divine 
support, namely, grace. Husserl speaks about grace when he writes: “Freely, 
and most properly, with divine grace humans must be motivated to strive to‑
wards this goal with the highest awareness and strength of will” (Husserl, 
1956: 16). Ethics will refer them back to metaphysics, that is the problem of 
God. But in order to understand deeply the sense or meaning of the world, 
they both need religion. This is very interesting and we can find this idea of 
God in many of Husserl’s manuscripts.
A MYSTICAL WAY TO GOD?
The sixth way towards God is perhaps, I must say “perhaps”, a mystical way. 
In the critical literature on Husserl very few commentators have examined the 
question of God. Notable among these is James Hart. His edited volume  Essays 
in phenomenological theology was published in 1986 (Hart, 1986), one year after 
my first book on Husserl on the problem of God (Ales Bello, 1985). Hart main‑
tains that the notion of God in a broad sense, is present in one’s interiority and 
it is understood consciously. The I appropriates it, moving from exteriority to 
interiority, but living it in itself. He distinguishes two aspects. I propose to use 
the Latin expression, quod nos, to designate what is inside us, as opposed to 
what is in se, in itself, where “itself ” here means God, who is present in con‑
sciousness but who also transcends it. We have already seen in the second way, 
the subjective way in connection with Anselm, how according to Husserl the 
world is transcendent with respect to the human being but so much more is 
God. The finite human being could never know God if he or she did not have 
the trace of God’s presence — this is also Prof. Hart’s position. Hart affirms 
that because of the influence of Plotinus and Saint Augustine, Husserl’s posi‑
tion is the same as that found in Western mysticism.
Here — he writes — “the divine is the center of all consciousness, of all conscious 
centers, the soul of the souls and at the same time the horizon for all utopian projects 
and for those focused on happiness” (Hart, 1986: 142).
Hart’s observation, which intends to establish an affinity of perspectives 
rather than affirm that Husserl is speaking about a mystical dimension, leads 
to an investigation of Husserl’s position on mysticism and whether or not Hus‑
serl had made a reference to it. My studies of the exponents of Husserl’s school 
of thought have led me to a particularly significant text. At this point a certain 
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premise is necessary. Edith Stein is well known as one of Husserl’s disciples 
who became interested in mystics after her departure from Husserl. Indeed she 
later wrote an essay The interior castle as Appendix in Finite and eternal being 
(Stein, 2002a) and a book The science of Cross, about the mystics (Stein, 2002b), 
towards the end of her short life.
Another less known disciple, Gerda Walther, wrote, in 1923, a book enti‑
tled Phänomenologie der Mystik (Walther, 1976), which naturally came to her 
teacher’s attention. She sent to Husserl her book on the problem of mystics and 
Husserl replied with a long letter that can be considered a short essay which 
contains a very interesting conclusion (Husserl, 1924: 7). He spoke about the 
possibility of an excavation of the depths of the human interiority. He says that 
the subject possesses its own particular world with its own particular depth. 
Husserl shows that there is a possibility to descend into the deep profundity of 
the human being — as we have already seen in the second way — and to ascend 
from the depths, from the profoundest profundities. A mystical experience is 
not just a religious experience; though it is also a religious experience, it is in 
particular the experience of a special contact with the presence of God himself 
inside the human being. Because it is a very particular experience, it is not even 
given to all people but it is possible to have it, if God wants to manifest himself 
through “a personal Revelation”, as Edith Stein said.
CONCLUSION
In Husserl we can find the possibility of a special encounter with God, that 
one of the mystical experience. In fact, one could rightly ask if this “profound‑
est profundity”, mentioned by Husserl, has something to do with it. Husserl 
wrote nothing about this point but Walther, in her introduction to the new 
edition of her book in 1955, records Husserl’s opinion on her work, claiming 
that mysticism according to Husserl, concerns ideal possibilities. A mystical 
experience is possible, though the sole real thing is the experience of the mysti‑
cal, as one cannot establish the reality of the object of which one had an expe‑
rience. Husserl therefore could not cope with the subjective aspect of mystical 
experience, but still affirmed that it is possible that someone had this particular 
experience. What he doubts is the real relation with divinity but in this sense 
we can accept that, according to him, it is possible to be open towards God, 
that God lives in us and that God can manifest himself in us in a very particular 
way. This is a possibility. And Husserl observes that “possibility” means that 
it could become real.
I have found six ways to God and in these ways we have philosophy and 
religion coming together. That is religion in the sense of religious experi‑
ence according to Husserl, who really was a very religious person. Religious 
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experience is, according to him, something present in the human being, but 
as a philosopher, he strives to understand better, to explain the meaning this 
religious experience through rational reflection.
The two ‑fold manner to arrive at God, i.e., the philosophico ‑argumentative 
approach and the religious experiential one, do not contrast with one another. 
Husserl does not oppose them; rather, he sees them as complimentary. From 
this point of view, his analysis harmonizes the philosophical way and the reli‑
gious one.
Furthermore, in his analyses there are innovations which can be under‑
lined. First the recovery of the hyletic dimension with its potent structure is 
innovative, be it in relation to the philosophical theme of religion, discovered 
here operating at different levels of depth, including those that are apparently 
not reachable by rational means, be it in relation to the justification of sacro‑
‑religious experience. Concerning the latter, phenomenological analysis, by its 
making evident the structures present in the human being, allows us to recover 
the pathway that leads to the origin of such experience in the human subject.
It does so moving from the trace of the divine, rising up to the psychic 
processes of attraction and repulsion, that is, sensory feelings, and moving 
to spiritual dimension. The weight attributed to various moments, i.e., the 
hyletic of sentiments brought on by the senses and noetic on of spiritual acts, 
permits us to understand the differences among the various expressions of the 
sacro ‑religious. In this innovative way, it is possible to configure a new “phe‑
nomenology of religion” that founds itself on a phenomenological archeology, 
as an analysis of the sacro ‑religious expressions. This topic is developed in the 
third part of my book The divine in Husserl and other explorations and in my last 
book Il senso del sacro. Dall’arcaicità alla desacralizzazione (Ales Bello, 2015b).
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